Sign up for daily information updates from CleanTechnica via email. Or follow us on Google News!
Recently, I had the opportunity to converse with Gavin Mudd, the director of the center for critical minerals intelligence at the British Geological Survey. He has been conducting significant research with global collaborators on how much of various resources we can truly access. Below is the first segment of our discussion and a lightly edited transcript.
Michael Barnard [MB]: Greetings, welcome back to Redefining Power—Tech. I’m your host, Michael Barnard. As always, we are sponsored by TFIE Strategy, a firm that aids investment funds and companies in selecting the winners while avoiding the losers in climate solutions. My guest today is Gavin Mudd, the director of the Critical Minerals Intelligence center at the British Geological Survey and an expert in a quite fascinating field. Welcome, Gavin.
Gavin Mudd [GM]: Thank you for having me.
MB: That accent is intriguing because it’s not a typical British accent. It’s British-adjacent, I would say. I typically start these discussions by asking, who is Gavin Mudd? How did you land in a new home in the British suburbs, leading your function?
GM: I suppose I’m an environmental engineer by profession. That was essentially where my journey began. However, part of the reason for this is that I’m a very devoted Bruce Cockburn fan, and his song “If a Tree Falls” has always inspired me profoundly. So, I chose an environmental career path. After completing my degree in environmental engineering back in Australia, I swiftly transitioned into a PhD program, which focused on the impacts on groundwater from a tailings dam, particularly a coal fly ash dam.
I remember contemplating halfway through my PhD while engaging with community groups about environmental issues related to mining, where is the overall picture of mining? I’m obtaining a PhD based on the effects at one site, but what about the entire industry? How do we begin evaluating the environmental performance of the entire sector? Once you have that thought, you can’t unthink it. So, it starts either from the bottom up or the top down, but there was no one doing that. No one was examining this systemic performance of the mining sector from an independent perspective. I completed my PhD, then entered academia and began to publish papers examining topics such as declining ore grades and the evolving nature of how we manage mining. I also posed questions about resource trends, such as whether we’re truly at risk of running out soon, or similar queries.
Initially, my focus was solely Australia, and then I published a number of papers along those lines. Tom Graedel from Yale University reached out to me and invited collaboration on what was then termed critical metals. One concern was that we lacked solid data for elements like indium, hafnium, tellurium, and other metals that were anticipated to be critically important for new energy technologies necessary for achieving net zero, among other things, not to mention current technologies and industries such as aerospace and construction that often require specialized alloys. Thus, we dove into studying cobalt and other related elements.
I believe through this, we began a series of global resources and scale studies examining what was genuinely occurring in mining and how do we accurately define what sustainability entails. As a result, I’ve been progressively working through the periodic table to the point now where it has prompted me to say that it’s time for a new challenge. I came over about a year ago to join BGS and lead the Critical Minerals Intelligence Center. That’s how I arrived here, I suppose.
MB: There’s so much to unpack there. Why don’t we start generally with what the British Geological Survey does?
GM: We’re a public good scientific institution, thus we conduct extensive research, with roughly half of our work funded by the UK government for national geoscience purposes. This encompasses a variety of activities, including surface and groundwater studies, geological mapping, geospatial technologies, and data creation. In regard to the other half of our funding, termed external work, that’s often still supported by the UK government. However, much of this pertains to our international endeavors, which could involve capacity building for geological surveys in different countries in Africa, collaborating with various international partners. Although much of our externally funded work is still largely government-funded, it relates to many geological issues and other matters.
Such work might include establishing and managing laboratories, geological mapping, assessing mining or water, and various other topics or hazards. We have a substantial team that works considerably on geohazards, such as earthquakes, landslides, and so forth. That’s a significant portion of what BGS does. We have a broad scope, but at our core, we remain an independent public good science institution.
MB: I have to admit, I’m not surprised that you have an Australian accent. Part of my unusual background is that I worked for one of the largest technology firms globally. We bid extensively on solutions for the mining sector. Interestingly, whenever I was involved in a bid within Canada, we frequently brought in Australian consultants because they are considered external experts. However, when bidding anywhere else, we relied on Canadian consultants. It’s surprising how much of the world’s minerals are sourced from these two countries and how skilled we are at extraction. That said, we likely share the regrettable tendency to export them for processing, refining, and higher-value products.
However, the conversation today focuses specifically on critical minerals. There has been a lot of absurd commentary from various naysayers regarding critical minerals claiming we can’t achieve our goals. Therefore, what I wanted to do today was to dissect this issue with someone who genuinely understands all the answers. Among other things, I’ve reviewed your papers where you’ve conducted surveys on the amounts of recoverable resources in major parts of the globe. Let’s begin by defining critical minerals and expand on the list you mentioned, but with a more detailed explanation of what we classify as critical minerals today.
GM: At the core…
heart, essential minerals are elements we value and we’re apprehensive about their scarcity. This is actually the optimal approach to elucidate everything. Now, the manner in which we quantify that and present as much objective information as possible is by discussing global supply risk as one aspect of this. This could encompass factors like which countries produce certain metals or minerals. Global supply risk may evaluate international trade. It can examine recycling. Numerous elements are only obtainable because we’ve extracted something else initially. For instance, indium necessitates mining zinc first, and during the refinement of zinc concentrates, we can then extract indium and cadmium along with a few other elements if desired, provided the concentrations are adequate.
Thus, that companion metal fraction, as we often refer to it, or byproduct, is probably a simpler term. Many byproducts are available solely when you extract another mineral. We compile all these factors to assess global supply risk. Generally, it’s primarily an economic consideration and that has undoubtedly been the main emphasis, yet it’s not the only one. Some nations, like the US and others, for nearly a century, have also incorporated a significant national security perspective in various ways. Therefore, you might apply the economic value or economic impact, or you could analyze it from a national security viewpoint, especially for some countries, like the US and others. That economic impact is the kind of issue we’re questioning, well, what’s the scale of value that can be utilized?
If we’re discussing something like, let’s choose tellurium, the global tellurium market is roughly $100 or $200 million US annually and that’s about it. That economic value is relatively small. For iron ore, you’re likely considering around a trillion dollars or so. When you’re discussing these kinds of minerals, they must add up. Combine all that together, and you can determine what the total economic value is. Consequently, if the supply of, whether it be tellurium or iron or something else, is compromised, that gives you an understanding of how vulnerable your economy is. Usually, we express the economic aspect as economic vulnerability in many ways. It’s a risk assessment and a risk analysis.
We examine probability, we examine outcomes or likelihood and severity. We can think about essential minerals in that very same light. Some materials, like iron, are abundantly supplied globally. From Australia, approximately 9 billion tonnes each year, thank you very much. Then, compare that to China’s a few hundred million tons, as well as Brazil. So iron ore is fairly well supplied on a global scale, but materials like rare earth elements, for instance, are still predominantly mined in China. Currently, we’re expanding production in a few other countries, whether it’s Myanmar, albeit at significant environmental and social cost, and also in Australia, where we have been enhancing our output, thus beginning to introduce a bit more diversity into the rare earth supply chain. However, at present, it’s still around 75% from China.
When you contemplate that, you would say the supply risk for global rare earths, for instance, is notably high. In contrast, when evaluating the supply risk for iron, we might categorize it as quite low. However, examining the economic significance, certainly iron is much more widely utilized. It’s in construction, it’s in automotive industries, it’s in aerospace. Many of our electronic devices still contain some iron, and so when we’re discussing all these factors, we’d assert that the economic vulnerability for iron is extremely high.
Compared to, say, rare earths, where it’s somewhat more mid-range, possessing more specialized technologies, but of course, those specialized technologies, whether it’s renewable energy, electric vehicles, and all the other applications we utilize rare earths for, especially chemicals, specialty alloys, and even in electronics, we highly value that material and we depend on it. We require it to help us tackle challenges such as climate change mitigation, and so forth. That’s the typical framework we consider regarding essential minerals. Broadly speaking, if we delve into semantics, when we refer to minerals, we might be discussing a metal, an element, a material, or a fuel.
Usually, if you look at something like helium, for instance, it might often be deemed essential, yet it’s a gas; it’s not precisely a mineral. But just to keep policy language straightforward and so forth, we typically refer to minerals. The EU, of course, uses the term critical raw materials. There are variations on that theme, but essentially it’s anything, any materials in whatever form that flows through our societies to obtain the items we desire.
MB: I always consider essential minerals as metals, and I have a somewhat informed layperson’s perspective on this because I’m on the demand side. I examine the global transformation in transportation, worldwide energy transformation, matters of that nature, which generates a specific category of demand, particularly for EVs and renewables. We have adequate quantities of these materials to build those technologies as a means to decarbonize our economy and energy services. I’m on that front, so I receive information from that perspective, and in that sense, certainly one of the major topics is the two primary battery metals that are discussed: cobalt and lithium.
From my viewpoint, is that accurate? Is there another metal that tends to gain your attention or is emerging as a concern for you at the Critical Minerals Intelligence Center?
GM: No, I believe when you examine the recent criticality assessment we’ve conducted for the UK, many of the specific elements or metals deemed critical are largely the same as those in the EU and the US and others. Now just by, I suppose, a peculiarity of the data, palladium is no longer considered critical, but the other four platinum group elements are still listed as critical, especially platinum, rhodium, iridium, and ruthenium. Many of these make sense because those that we’ve labeled critical are necessary for all the technologies we need for net zero and the energy transition and similar matters. Thus, there are certainly some elements that I believe we could see increased demand for in the future, such as scandium, which is used for aluminum and scandium specialty alloys.
Globally, no one has really attempted to develop supplies of scandium due to a lack of demand. Those on the demand side haven’t concerned themselves with it because there’s no supply. This typical kind of chicken and egg dilemma. Now, we understand historically, there have been numerous instances throughout mining over the past couple of centuries or so, whenever we reach those inflection points where demand begins to rise, and subsequently, miners think, ‘Oh, there’s demand there, we will start generating supply,’ and then things accelerate from that point onward. And, as expected, once it takes off, it becomes evident. You might observe this with aluminum as the entire Héroult process and the Bayer process transformed the economics of aluminum production, allowing it to be produced on a much larger scale.
We were able to witness that rapid surge in demand for aluminum really take off. We’ve observed comparable trends in nickel where…
Inco, ultimately, in Sudbury, allocated a substantial amount in its formative years towards research and development, mainly promoting people to adopt stainless steel. They focused on essentially creating their own market demand. By encouraging the adoption of stainless steel, this established the need for them to enhance the supply. It was quite an inventive approach and something I believe that Inco, I think individuals have overlooked the significance of that innovation in the early years of Inco, over a century ago.
I think when you consider various elements, we are witnessing some of these factors unfold, certainly lithium is experiencing remarkable growth at the moment as a result of the current demand. The supply seems to be catching up somewhat. At present, what we are observing is a typical oversupply issue in the market that has caused prices to plummet. We are observing similar trends with nickel as well. I believe one aspect of cobalt that has surprised a few individuals in recent years is the shift towards lithium iron phosphate batteries in China. This development has significantly reduced the need for NMC-based batteries, which include nickel, manganese, and cobalt. As a result, we haven’t required as much cobalt.
For most of the past decade, cobalt production remained relatively stagnant. In the last couple of years, it has started to increase significantly once more. We will see where that leads. For at least the next decade, I believe we will continue to see that batteries for electric vehicles will primarily be lithium-based. There might be a role for sodium and other alternatives. It’s certainly challenging to predict exactly how all of this will unfold, and I believe it is difficult to foresee what happens beyond the next ten years, who knows?
What we have witnessed, I suppose, in the evolution over the last 10 to 20 years in terms of this type of technology is that as we begin with traditional industrial learning curves, they become more affordable, typically become more powerful, and things evolve. We do see changes, whether in battery chemistry or alterations in aspects like drivetrains for electric vehicles as well. I believe we are still likely to remain predominately rare-earth-based; however, that is certainly not the only option for permanent magnets. I think it’s an intriguing field, and it’s essential to remain observant of developments.
MB: There’s a lot to unpack there. I’ll start with a personal story. I grew up about 80 miles from Sudbury, near the INCO site. There are two relevant points here. I was in Sudbury as a child witnessing the pouring of slag. They would dump molten slag onto these hills of waste. The narrative was that NASA trained its astronauts by having them perform moonwalks over these fields of barren, desolate slag. It was always fascinating driving towards Sudbury as the trees became shorter and shorter. The nickel processing operation emitted substances that were harmful to trees, stunting their growth.
This relates to the sustainability issue of minerals processing, which you began your career with and have continued to explore. There’s a connection there. However, there’s also something else that is quite relevant. You mentioned lithium iron phosphate batteries. That introduces the critical topic that we will revisit frequently, which is the substitutability of minerals for other minerals. One of the news pieces that emerged this week, from RenewEconomy in Australia, edited by my acquaintance Giles Parkinson, reported that at an auction in China, the average price for a comprehensive battery energy storage system, including cells, the container, thermal management, battery management system, and everything else, was $66 USD per kilowatt hour. Earlier this year, we were astounded by $67 per kilowatt hour for cells alone.
Now we are witnessing $66 for the entire pack. It’s astonishing, it’s mind-blowing. Additionally, this year CATL commenced deliveries of 300 watt hour per kilogram lithium iron phosphate batteries, exceeding the standards for lithium-ion batteries that Tesla has been utilizing in its vehicles, achieving impressive range. This surpasses the level utilized in the Tesla semi truck, which is around 256. The repeated observation I encounter is individuals in the battery sector stating, well, this is the limit, and it’s insufficient, and there’s no way to address that. However, now with something perceived as a lower energy density battery metal combination, lithium iron phosphate, we are witnessing higher outcomes because we have a long way to progress in electrochemistry and we possess considerable mineral substitutability.
The entire essential mineral narrative at a certain point is a misunderstanding, as we have a plethora of materials and we can utilize various alternatives. You mentioned iron and aluminum. I’m going to utilize the North American pronunciation, as I simply cannot get my head around that extra ‘i,’ although I have a British father.
GM: That’s fine; I will overlook it.
MB: As we consider iron, indeed, we can actually substitute aluminum. We don’t do it very often because it appears costlier than steel. Another aspect we have numerous inquiries about is the requirement for various wires. Vehicles contain a lot of wires. The transmission systems require extensive wiring. Heat pumps also contain wiring, and everything involves wires. They are predominantly copper. However, actually, many of them are aluminum since aluminum is a conductor as well, albeit with different properties.
You might have heard about the advanced reconductoring of transmission wires. That involves a carbon fiber core with annealed aluminum conductors wrapped around it, which is significantly lighter and substantially less sagging than the current models, which are steel core, copper-wrapped. We can actually operate transmissions with the pylons placed further apart or string new wires with greater capacity over the same pylons. We have this remarkable potential for substitution. It’s not magic; it’s engineering.
I should also mention this perception that if a metal is poorly processed in one location for whatever reason, for instance, child labor prevalent in the Congo for cobalt, that doesn’t imply it’s true everywhere. Sometimes we have supplies in various locations. Let’s take the rare earth scenario. You know the quote I always cherish about rare earths: they’re not rare, and they’re not earths. They’re found everywhere.
In the United States, there was a significant rare earth mine and processing facility. They exist on every continent as far as I know. In fact, I’m going to ask you, are most rare earths available on every continent?
GM: There are deposits everywhere. There are numerous different types of deposits containing rare earths. Now, sometimes rare earths are the primary product; it’s what you mine for, just as you would mine a gold deposit. However, sometimes there is considerable rare earth content as a byproduct. Compared to other materials, they tend to be a lower value product. You can find examples in Australia where a mineral known as monazite, which is a rare earth phosphate mineral, is associated with heavy mineral sands. Wherever you mine heavy mineral sands, the question becomes what small fraction…
of the dense mineral concentration, which includes substances like rutile or titanium dioxide, but also zircon, a zirconium silicate. You’ve obtained various minerals such as garnet and ilmenite, which is an iron titanium trioxide. Moreover, you also find monazite.
Monazite Australia stood as one of the largest exporters of monazite worldwide, which was utilized to produce rare earth elements until China essentially dominated the rare earth market in the 1990s. Since that time, mineral sands producers have mainly been either discarding monazite back into the tailings or, in Western Australia, they’ve amassed stockpiles for three decades. They currently possess a significant accumulation of monazite, for which they are now establishing a novel rare earth refinery for processing. I believe rare earth deposits can be located all around the globe; it’s merely a matter of determining if they constitute a primary deposit or a byproduct. Next, you must examine the mineralogy and how they are processed along with everything else. That’s where the excitement truly begins because that’s the challenging part.
MB: Historically, they’ve posed challenges in North America as the processing was quite environmentally destructive. Therefore, there’s a conventional pattern across industries, where benign ones that neighbors don’t oppose and the Sierra Club endorses, remain most of the time. Those which are polluting get shipped overseas. Consequently, China, being forward-thinking and recognizing its objectives since the 80s, has taken charge. It’s not as if China is the sole location with rare earths or the only nation able to process them. It was the nation that declared we’re going to engage in this and dominate a substantial portion of this market.
Concerning Bayan Obo in Mongolia, located in the north of China, I’ve perused literature about this area. There’s a remarkable book authored by a woman who diligently learned Mandarin and ventured into the remote regions of China’s mining sectors, visiting the mines and returning with captivating narratives. [Rare Earth Frontiers: From Terrestrial Subsoils to Lunar Landscapes]. Her assertion was that in the realm of mining and mineral extraction, there’s a noticeable inclination to target locations that are hinterlands, where jurisdictional disputes can allow regulations to be overlooked. China did this in Inner Mongolia, where there existed such an interstitial aspect. Her perspective was that beach mining nodules in the deep ocean are similar regarding the lack of regulations governing that domain since it’s international waters. Who would challenge you?
Returning to rare earth processing, it has garnered a reputation as one of the most difficult sets of minerals to refine and process. Could you describe and provide further precision on that and clarify what the true difficulties are and if they have been surmounted?
GM: Indeed, China has successfully addressed the processing due to the rare earths forming a family, if we adhere to the comprehensive definition. Typically, the entire lanthanoid series from lanthanum to ytterbium, plus yttrium and scandium, consists of 17 elements that need to be divided. Generally, we don’t focus on scandium since it usually exists in distinct minerals. We primarily discuss the lanthanoids and yttrium. They are quite chemically similar. Now, you have to separate them into often very high purity forms. This requires significant energy and many chemicals. This is part of the reason why rare earths necessitate such specialized processing.
Another aspect of the equation that is frequently overlooked or perhaps politely disregarded is the radioactivity. You consistently find thorium and uranium associated with rare earth minerals. Now, in some regions of the globe, monazite minerals have a higher proportion of thorium compared to other areas. Generally, they are more thorium prevalent than uranium. Some rare earth deposits also have economically viable concentrations of uranium associated with them and, at times, there is considerable uranium present as well. This is certainly the case in certain deposits in Australia. The concerns surrounding Mount Weld in Australia, for instance, include the export of concentrates from there to Malaysia. I have offered guidance to the Malaysian community, who never anticipated the radioactive thorium byproducts remaining in Malaysia. They initially did not want that process at all. They would much prefer that liners were built for their refinery in Australia in the first instance.
The dilemma is that from an engineering perspective, as we navigate the regulatory frameworks, the manner in which we classify radioactive waste often leads individuals to view thorium and think, well, it has such a low specific activity—meaning a low rate of radioactive decay—that it’s not even considered low-level waste. It’s barely above natural background levels, perhaps. However, when examining the decay products of thorium, they do not behave similarly. They actually possess much shorter half-lives. Any exposure to these presents a significant public health risk. We need to ensure that we are managing these residues and keeping them isolated.
The challenge is that people refer to radioactive waste classification guidelines established by organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency. They examine thorium and conclude, it’s too low to matter. Yet, consequently, we apply minimal engineering standards to it, while communities assess the decay products and argue, well, hang on, they are indeed significant. If that material gets exposed, then you have a potential exposure risk that must be taken seriously. The issue lies within the regulatory approach.
This is not merely a Malaysian issue; it’s a more widespread problem, indicating a conflict between the radioactive waste classification procedures of the IAEA and the perceptions of risk held by communities, which must be addressed. I believe part of the global issue regarding the reputation of rare earths stems from the fact that no communities perceive that risk is being managed appropriately. This issue exists in China, as it does in Malaysia and elsewhere. There are certainly some rare earth deposits exhibiting significantly lower concentrations of both thorium and uranium. However, once again, Norra Kärr in Sweden would be among those.
There are additional rare earth projects that have substantial uranium associated with them, which could be economically extracted alongside the rare earths. Kvanefjeld in Greenland is one such example. The Dubbo project in Australia is another, located in New South Wales a few hours west of Sydney. However, in New South Wales, it is actually illegal to extract and subsequently sell uranium. They have essentially resolved that question. It implies that we must comprehend where all the thorium and the uranium radionuclides and all the decay products are directed as well.
I believe when I’ve examined that project, particularly concerning the standards array for how they propose to manage it, it’s likely one of the next rare earth projects poised to be developed globally. They have conducted extremely detailed studies and established engineering standards that surpass what individuals would generally anticipate for a low-level radioactive waste facility. I believe it can be accomplished. We grasp what needs to be done. In the…identical approach, when you observe Sudbury, for example, they built the massive stack and installed sulfur dioxide captures and then produced acid from that. They recognized that the value of the acid was primarily offsetting the costs of mitigating the sulfur dioxide emissions. It was not necessarily profitable, but at least it covered their expenses and sufficed.
We understand what actions are necessary and we can resolve that industry, but we must ensure we recognize the criteria we are applying and confirm that the community accepts those standards. This has been a significant issue within the rare earth sector.
MB: You mentioned something specific. I referred to rare earths as being among those that are characterized as much more environmentally complex. You noted something I had heard but lacked details on, which is that China has found a way to address this. My understanding is that around 2010, China shifted its focus and said we need to actually remediate that Inner Mongolian processing area. They have invested substantially in more environmentally sound processes. Can you A, confirm if my timeline and characterization are accurate, and B, provide more insight into that?
GM: You always need to be cautious about certain assertions that are commonly made. Certainly, China has acknowledged its environmental repercussions. This was occurring prior to the 2010 stringent export restrictions being established. Part of it is China stating, well, yes, we’re producing them economically, but that’s because we’re not accounting for our costs related to issues such as community impacts, pollution effects, and so forth. When you consider how we’ve been operating in the West broadly for the last 50 or so years since implementing environmental regulations, we have placed either pollution control technologies into effect, we employ cleaner manufacturing processes to largely design out the generation of pollution from the outset wherever feasible. Additionally, we then engage in proper waste management in significantly stricter manners.
When we examine the waste after processing, so you take an ore that could be in the case of a rare earth mine, say 1 to 5% rare earth oxide. Thus, you’re dealing with approximately 95 to 99% of that rock that you are processing that is not actually rare earths. It’s predominantly silicates, it’s iron, it’s other elements. That’s the waste we refer to as tailings and it typically goes to a large tailings dam. Now if you’re not managing that tailings dam by, let’s say, keeping it water-covered, it’ll dry out, which generates dust. Now depending on your geographical location, you may have different options for how you manage dust arising from a tailings dam, but definitely dust is a significant issue in Bayan Obo, it’s a dry region.
There are various examples globally that we could reference concerning different types of pollution risks. We’ve determined what we could do in terms of achieving better environmental outcomes and obtaining improved safety outcomes, including for workers, but also for local communities. That’s just the mining aspect. Then where China has substantially progressed compared to the rest of us is in processing, which involves refining into the various rare earth elements and subsequently integrating that into technologies like permanent magnets and so forth. And that’s where they are exceedingly protective of their intellectual property.
That’s where I believe China has certainly managed to establish a grip, not only on the mining supply, but also on that processing aspect in terms of refining into specific components, individual rare earth elements, which are then utilized in technologies such as permanent magnets or other applications.
MB: This undoubtedly brings up a topic I intended to discuss, which was my observation regarding China, as it has secured control over this sector, having undertaken the necessary cleanup, resulting in a scenario where the West needs to rely on China and its experts for processing and refining rare earths in an effective and efficient manner. What I am hearing supports my bias that this is indeed the case. However, you specifically mentioned their strong protection of intellectual capital. Are they willing to license it? Are they open to sharing that knowledge or only for a substantial fee? Is the West compelled to redevelop that expertise independently?
GM: I believe certainly when you’re examining it, many of the export regulations from China are actually restricting not just the movement of materials, but also the technologies related to processing. This includes permanent magnets and other items as well. They are very protective of their intellectual property. Now, we could—and indeed there are nations around the world whether it’s Japan, the UK, the US, Canada, and others—we’re all endeavoring to build our own capacity in that domain. However, yes, China is serious about addressing the environmental aspects and ensuring that they genuinely rectify these issues. That’s based on their own experts and so on. And it’s not limited to just the rare earth sector.
The recent limitations on antimony exports stem largely from the fact that China used to produce about 70% or more of the global antimony supply, potentially even up to 75% currently, due to having faced numerous pollution challenges and communities affected by that. They have implemented much stricter environmental regulations, which has led to about 60% of their antimony industry shutting down mines, smelters, and refineries. This means they no longer possess an excess quantity of antimony available for export. What they produce, which is effectively around 40% of what they were generating a decade ago, they must use for domestic purposes. Antimony exemplifies some of the complexities in how China navigates these issues.
It’s not merely a matter of geopolitics or such concerns. At times, they have genuinely taken decisive actions to clean up some of their own industrial sectors, which in turn necessitates changes in what they export. Certainly, within the rare earth arena, they are progressing by undertaking more efforts to achieve better environmental outcomes. However, this is a long-term endeavor. You have large sectors or mines like Bayan Obo that have been operational for decades. Similar to Sudbury, you cannot alter the results from a place like that swiftly. They certainly remain very protective of their intellectual property. Based on everything I’ve observed, this does lead to a question of expertise.
MB: I’ll focus on the Northvolt case as it’s a prominent topic for many in the West currently, particularly given Northvolt’s difficulties. One of the observations that has been made is that they employed 4,000 individuals and had 1,000 in their R&D group, while CATL has 16,000 people in their R&D group alone. I was in New Zealand last year and conducted a four-city speaking tour that focused on the demand side for critical minerals with mining and minerals audiences there. I expressed that it’s an opportune time to be involved in minerals since the West must develop them. What they conveyed to me was that universities in New Zealand had ceased offering mining and minerals programs.
A question for you
Is the gap in human resources within mining, metallurgy, processing, and refining significant between China and the rest of the globe? How extensive is this gap and how long might it take to bridge it?
GM: It’s a substantial gap and a critical issue across all mining countries in the west, whether it’s Australia or elsewhere. The University of Wollongong recently announced their intention to close down their sciences department. There are only about four or five universities in Australia that offer mining engineering programs. While most universities maintain a geology or earth sciences department, these are often focused on a variety of other aspects of geosciences, not exclusively on economic geology and mining. Attracting students to geology is quite challenging. I believe part of the issue stems from the perception that mining is a dirty industry, and historically, even the sector acknowledges that mining has caused significant adverse effects.
Often, I like to compare them because when we contrast agriculture to mining, people point out, “Oh, look at all the land that agriculture utilizes and clears.” There are numerous biodiversity implications that have already occurred. In terms of agriculture practices, we can modify them and start to restore some biodiversity. Generally, not all of it, but it’s like chalk and cheese. We still need food, metals, and energy. In mining, however, the impacted area is much smaller.
Farming covers a large area but has a very low level of impact spread across that area. This does accumulate. It’s not that these challenges aren’t worth addressing, and many segments of the agricultural community recognize that. When we examine mining, it can lead to very acute impacts, and sometimes those effects can manifest off-site rapidly, as evidenced by tailings disasters in Brazil, including Mount Polley in Canada. During mining, if it’s not managed properly, it can generate very acute effects. What we need to seriously contemplate is that, ultimately, it comes back to these same fundamental issues. We recognize the impacts are present, we know how to manage them and improve our practices. It’s merely a matter of ensuring that we are actually implementing those changes. In the west, the prevailing view of mining is that it still carries this historical acute influence.
Historically, that has been the case, but largely we have learned to improve. People often state that Australia, Canada, and similar places are among the top jurisdictions in terms of regulating mining. They are certainly above average, but there’s still room for enhancement. We can perform better. The Mount Polley incident didn’t occur in a developing nation; it took place in British Columbia, which is a primary mining province in Canada. There were regulatory failings, as well as corporate shortcomings. I believe this is what communities are responding to. We are redeveloping mining or ensuring we can enhance the diversity and reliability of our essential mineral supplies. That’s the kind of initiative we need to pursue.
We must train significantly more geologists, yet there still exists the notion that mining is a dirty business, and we haven’t effectively addressed that issue. This is something the industry has begun to grapple with. It can’t be solely an industry effort; it also requires involvement from professional bodies and government. This is the context when we consider the trends we observe in earth sciences, particularly in fields such as mining engineering and economic geology. The quantity of graduates is on the decline to the point where universities are shutting down programs, making it increasingly difficult to maintain them.
When you consider the scale of China, it implies they are producing a significant number of graduates in this area. It’s a challenging issue, certainly on the global agenda. However, it’s a complex problem that isn’t going to be resolved swiftly. I believe one of the pathways we can take to move forward in that space, which helps connect various ideas, is that recently the UN Secretary-General convened a panel focused on critical energy transition minerals. They just need to update the terminology a bit, but that’s acceptable. Among the key recommendations was the establishment of a global Mining Legacy Fund.
If we allocated, for the sake of discussion, 0.01% of global mining revenues into this fund or even a portion of profits, we would be generating hundreds of millions of dollars annually towards a fund of this nature. These funds could then be utilized to rehabilitate some problematic mining sites. Whether that involves contentious locations like Bougainville or Ok Tedi, or other sites we could rehabilitate, there remains considerable work to be done in Sudbury, alongside efforts required at other abandoned mines in British Columbia, as well as in Australia and beyond. If we had a fund like this, we could address some of these mining sites, confront the perception surrounding mining as an inherently dirty business, and truly begin to advance on these issues.
To me, this has always been something I have advocated for passionately for a long time. I was genuinely pleased to see it highlighted as a key recommendation in the UN Secretary-General’s report. We need to implement this. This is a long-term endeavor where we must ensure we have the engineers and scientists who truly understand the issues, whether it’s environmental engineers like myself with experience in the mining sector, mining engineers, or all the other components necessary to guarantee we conduct mining responsibly, because we can’t afford to make mistakes. We cannot afford to get it wrong again.
MB: The gap in human resources and the deficit in intellectual capital are quite concerning. I hadn’t initially expected to take this direction, but I observe various instances. I consider the semiconductor sector, with Taiwan being home to TSMC. I also examine high assay low enrichment uranium (HALEU), where there’s a complete supply chain dominated by a historically problematic and unreliable player, Russia. Now we face challenges related to rare earth elements, as the west has effectively allowed itself to relinquish rare earth extraction, processing, and refining, outsourcing it all to China. These issues seem quite evident from the perspective of security and economics, which were clear to see, yet governments appeared indifferent or inactive for quite some time.
Can you share any insights into why it was overlooked? Because the concept of critical materials and minerals isn’t new. The security of a nation is hardly a novel idea. The resilience of supply chains is also not a recent concept. How did we, particularly in the west, lose sight of this?
GM: To be candid, I don’t have a solid answer. What I can assert is that we may have allowed free market principles to dominate excessively, opting for the lowest cost without probing into the true cost of where that supply originates. Take cobalt from the Congo as a case in point, and the artisanal…
Child laborers and minors involved in cobalt production emerging from the Congo represent a significant issue. The notion of blood diamonds was popularized in the late 1990s. I firmly believe that what we have done is rely solely on the lowest prices and allowed the free market to dictate terms. Now, markets are never flawless. There exist monopolies, duopolies, and in the rhenium sector, one company dominates with 70%, specifically Moly-Met, a Chilean firm.
Historically, we perceived Chile as a remarkably progressive nation that welcomed mining activities until 2019. I had just purchased a flight to Santiago for the annual COP meeting later that year. The following morning, I woke up to extreme riots sweeping across Santiago. This reverberated throughout the mining sector because Chile was supposed to be a forward-thinking country that employed its copper revenue, as they termed it. The government-owned entity Codelco clearly generates substantial revenue for the Chilean government and is also a highly profitable enterprise. However, it seems to have lacked adequate investment in progressive development for communities, particularly those engaged in mining.
The contentious point here is that communities are expressing a need for improvement. This has indeed raised concerns regarding some of these types of supplies. For me, the only way to truly perceive this is that we have depended on systems that have been merely satisfactory. We are now beginning to notice increased tension, whether it’s the threat of tariffs or export quotas, as well as restrictions on various technologies. So, I believe we are observing this unfolding, and whether it pertains to chips or other technologies, it’s indicative of a new world order. The faith in a free market has, I think, truly been shaken.
Governments globally are asserting that, in fact, we need to intervene in the market, we must take action. The entire discourse surrounding critical minerals highlights our role in providing the best guidance to the government to determine how to effectively achieve the diverse goals we have, whether it’s reaching net zero or addressing other pressing issues. That’s the most effective manner I have come to understand it, in any case.
MB: I definitely tend to concur. Industrial strategy for governments in the West, particularly in the UK and the United States, has fallen completely out of favor. One way I describe this is that China, as a major player in the global arena, is always moving towards where the ball will be, while Europe and North America are chasing it through market fluctuations.
Thus, we have this predicament in the West, as something that worked well for many aspects failed in others. The global geopolitics of globalization, market liberalization, and free trade led to numerous truly positive impacts worldwide. In China, this is a significant reason they managed to lift 850 million of their citizens out of dire poverty, a situation created by Mao’s policies. Yet, this undeniably remains a commendable achievement. Presently, China is rapidly installing 300 gigawatts of renewable energy annually and pivoting towards various initiatives.
Its economy has become more electrified, and we are witnessing that, you know, wind turbines, solar panels, batteries, and heat pumps produced in China are essential components for global decarbonization. What has transpired is not perfect, but that is the reality. It will indeed be fascinating to observe how these developments unfold in the future.
Contribute a few dollars monthly to assist independent cleantech journalism that promotes the cleantech movement!
Have insights for CleanTechnica? Want to advertise? Seeking to suggest a guest for our CleanTech Talk podcast? Reach out to us here.
Subscribe to our daily newsletter for 15 new cleantech stories a day. Or you can opt for our weekly version if daily updates feel too frequent.
CleanTechnica utilizes affiliate links. Review our policy here.
CleanTechnica’s Comment Guidelines
